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RECENT DECISIONS
Contracts-Promise to Pay When Able-Petition alleged an
oral agreement under which the defendant would reimburse plaintiff
upon the completion of certain construction work upon an apartment
building. The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff, "when she got
the apartments on a paying basis . . . when she was financially able
and the apartment was paying off." Held: these various statements
were practically equivalent to an agreement to pay when able. A
promise to pay when the promiser is financially able to do so is con-
strued to mean that payment was to be made within a reasonable
time. "The ability to pay" or any equivalent provision was too un-
certain and indefinite to constitute a condition: Sanford v. Luce 60
N.W. 2d 885 (Iowa, 1953).
The problem in this case is whether a contract calling for payment
by a promisor when able demands ability to pay as a condition pre-
cedent or whether a promise to pay when able is an absolute promise
with payment anticipated at least within a reasonable time. The courts
are split on this issue. A majority, taken numerically, hold that a
promise to pay when the promisor "is able" is not absolute but a
conditional promise.' A minority, however, followed in this case, hold
that a promise to pay when able is absolute, and payment must be
made at least within a reasonable time.2
The reasoning of the majority is based upon the premise that a
contract calling for payment by a promisor when he is able means
exactly what the words literally denote. So construed, the promisor
must pay only when, and if, and not before he is able. These courts
feel that, if one wishes to contract in this fashion, such contract is
proper, and that freedom to contract as the parties see fit must be
protected. The promisee cannot complain, since he got exactly what
he bargained for. One court puts it clearly:
"The express contract of the parties is that the debtor is to
pay when he shall be able, and that he shall be the judge of his
ability. No doubt the parties thought this a reasonable arrange-
ment when they made it, though creditors think otherwise now.
If it is reasonable for a man to release a debt altogether, surely
it is reasonable to release the remedies for a debt, not itself
released, as is done in covenants not to sue. And even if it be not
reasonable, we cannot set up our reason or the public reason for
that of contracting parties, and make a contract for them that is
contrary to their plain intention without violating the first prin-
ciple of freedom and the very nature of contract relations."' 3
On the other hand, the minority reasons that such a contract never
'12 Am. Ju., CONTRACTS §303; 94 A.L.R. 721.
2 12 Am. JuP-, CONTRACTS .§303; 94 A.L.R. 724; Mock v. Trustees of First
Baptist Church of Newport, 252 Ky. 243, 67 S.W. 2d 9 (1934).
3 Carlson v. Johnson, 275 Mich. 35, 265 N.W. 517 (1936).
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contemplated that the provision to pay when able would involve the
possibility that there might never be any payment. This, they feel,
would be contrary to the intention of the parties; and certainly con-
trary to the intent of the promisee, who obviously did not envision
that he might never receive his consideration. It would also seem con-
trary to justice to allow the promisor to receive his 'benefit without
giving anything in return. In a case regarding a promise by a church
to pay an architect for his services when able, the Kentucky court said:
"Such an agreement cannot be construed as requiring the archi-
tect to wait more than a reasonable time. He did not mean that
he would wait forever."4
The minority view has usually been held to prevail in those in-
stances where a promissory note or other commercial paper is in-
volved.5 The courts so deciding imply that, since the promisor has
already received that for which the promise to pay is given, he should
not be allowed to escape making recompense for it. One court puts
it clearly and succinctly:
"The parties evidently regarded the note as a binding obliga-
tion, and, whenever the language will permit, it should be so
construed as to support rather than destroy its legal obligation.
It is conceded that the intentions of the parties to a contract
cannot prevail if directly contrary to the plain sense of words
employed; but when the intention is sufficiently apparent, ef-
fect should be given to that intent, though some violence be
thereby done to the words."6
The question of what is the precise effect of a promise in a con-
tract to pay when able has not been decided by the Wisconsin court.
In considering what view should be followed, it would be pertinent
to note that both the majority and minority beg the question in that
each assumes the intention -of the parties, although that is precisely
what is at issue. The majority assumes that the parties intended pay-
ment only conditionally, and the minority assumes that payment is
intended absolutely. Actually, it seems fair to speculate that the parties
never really considered the issue at all, since the future ability of the
promisor to pay might reasonably have been assumed to be imminent,
and other possibilities were not considered. Hence one party must
endure a hardship by a term he did not contemplate.
In the interest of substantial justice it would seem that both the
modem and better reasoned view would be that a promise to pay
"when able" should be construed as demanding payment at least within
4 Mock v. Trustees of First Baptist Church of Newport, supra, note 2.
5 Benton v. Benton, 78 Kan. 366, 97 P. 378 (1908); Pistel v. Imperial Mutual
Life Insurance Co. of America, 88 Md. 640, 42 A. 210 (1898); Folkerts v.
Shields, 319 Ill. App. 261, 49 N.E. 2d 295 (1943).
6 Lewis v. Lipton, 10 Ohio State 88, 75 Am. Dec. 498 (1856).
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a reasonable time. Although this may work a heavy hardship upon a
promisor who is forced to pay before he feels himself able, to hold
such language as a condition precedent would work a heavier hard-
ship upon a promisee who might never receive value for what he has
given. However, the hardship on the promisor could be lightened, to a
certain extent at least, by construing a reasonable time most liberally
in favor of the promisor. To the average person this would seem the
fairest of two difficult alternatives. He would consider such a promise
as one requiring payment at some time.
Thus in the light of the balancing of the hardships and an attempt
at substantial justice, the Wisconsin court in any future decision
should, it seems, follow the lead of the Iowa court in Sanford v. Luce.
C. WILIAM IsAAcsoN
Landlord and Tenant-Leases-The Validity of Rent Accelera-
tion Clauses-The plaintiff leased premises to the defendant for
a three year period, rent payable monthly in advance. Under the
terms of the lease,' the lessor, without demand or notice, could law-
fully declare the term ended and re-enter the premises should the les-
see default in any of his contractual obligations. Furthermore, the
lessor had an option, in addition to his other remedies on default, to
give the lessee written notice of any default or neglect and to advise
the lessee that unless all the conditions and covenants of the lease were
complied with within thirty days, the entire rent for the remainder
of the term would become immediately due and payable. Eight months
after the beginning of the term, the lessee vacated the premises and
shortly thereafter defaulted in the payment of the rent due. The lessor
brought an action for rent on the rent acceleration clause in the lease.
Judgment was rendered for the lessor, and the lessee appealed. Held:
Judgment for the plaintiff reversed. Any clause in a lease of real
property for rent acceleration effective upon the breach of a covenant
to pay rent is void since it is either an agreement for liquidated dam-
ages, when the damages are readily ascertainable, or a penalty. Ricker
v. Rombough, 261 P. 2d 328 (Cal. 1953).
The courts are not in agreement concerning the validity of rent
I "Lessor may likewise at lessor's option and in addition to any other remedies
which lessor may have upon such default, failure or neglect, give to lessee
written notice of such default, failure or neglect and advise lessee thereby
that, unless all the terms, covenants and conditions of the lease are fully
complied with within thirty (30) days after giving of said notice, the en-
tire amount of rent herein reserved or agreed to be paid and then remain-
ing unpaid shall immediately become due and payable upon the expiration of
said thirty days. .. "
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